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                                                      ABSTRACT  
 
William Zang: ¡Viva el camarada Leonid Ilich Brézhnev!:                                                                                                                                         
           Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s 1974 Visit to Cuba 
        (Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
 
This essay on General Secretary Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba from January 28 
to February 3, 1974, examines the influence of détente on the Soviet-Cuban alliance using 
Brezhnev’s Cuban tour as a case study. I argue that Brezhnev, recognizing Cuba’s importance in 
maintaining détente with the United States, traveled to Cuba to ensure the success of this policy 
by strengthening the Soviet-Cuban alliance. Brezhnev consolidated détente by using his time in 
Cuba to allay Cuban fears that a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations took precedent over Cuban 
security from American intervention. I show that Brezhnev succeeded in extracting a cautious 
public endorsement of détente from Havana and in doing so found the limits of Soviet influence 
on Cuban behavior. I also determine that the vicissitudes of détente ultimately served to reinforce 
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“Long live the eternal friendship between Cuba and the USSR! Long live the glorious 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live comrade Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev! Fatherland or 
death! We will triumph!”1 Cuban leader Fidel Castro thus ended his speech on January 29, 1974, 
in front of one-million flag waving Cubans in the Plaza of the Revolution in central Havana. He 
made this address on the occasion of Soviet General Secretary Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s visit to 
Cuba from January 28 to February 3 that year. One day before Castro declared these words 
before a fired-up crowd of Cuban citizens, Brezhnev’s arrival in Havana made him the first 
Soviet general secretary to visit the “island of freedom,” as Soviet newspapers and publications 
referred to Cuba, and indeed all of Latin America. Cuba had become the first Latin American 
nation to host a Soviet leader because of the island’s close relationship with the Soviet Union 
that began shortly after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, when a mass movement led by Fidel Castro, 
his brother Raul, and Che Guevara, among others, toppled the U.S. supported dictator Fulgencio 
Batista. After quickly incurring Washington’s ire by fulfilling the promises of the Revolution 
through nationalizing foreign owned corporations and redistributing land, Havana formed an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, Washington’s sole superpower antagonist in the ideological war 
for the hearts and minds of people throughout the world that was the Cold War.  
                                               
Translations from Russian and Spanish are my own, unless otherwise specified. For Russian transliterations I have 
used the Library of Congress transliteration system. 
 
1 En aras del triunfo de la paz y el socialismo: materiales y documentos referentes a la visita oficial y amistosa a la 
Republica de Cuba de Leonid Brezhnev, Secretario General Del CC de PCUS (28 de enero-3 de febrero de 1974) 
(Moscú: Editorial de la Agencia de Prensa Novosti, 1974), 31.  Fidel Castro usually used the phrase “Fatherland or 
death! We will triumph!” to end his political speeches. 
 2 
The 1960s proved to be a turbulent period in Soviet-Cuban relations. Ties between 
Moscow and Havana were chilly at best between 1962 and 1968, initially caused by Soviet 
Premier Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev’s decision to negotiate an end to the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis directly with U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Fidel Castro had felt as though Khrushchev 
had gone over his head in ending the crisis and relations spiraled downward.2 Ideological 
disagreements on how best to propagate revolution in Latin America widened the rift, with 
Havana favoring its Foco theory3 and Moscow advocating for slower democratic transitions to 
power incentivized by states, such as Cuba, that had achieved a high level of development 
utilizing the communist model.4 By 1968 Cuba’s ailing economy and failure to incite other 
revolutions in Latin America along with Soviet economic disengagement left Havana with no 
choice but to patch things up with Moscow.5 Brezhnev’s visit marked a new high point in Soviet-
                                               
2 Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991 (London: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 55. 
 
3 Inspired by the strategies of the guerilla fighters in the Cuban Revolutionary War (1956-1959), the Foco theory of 
revolution asserted that small groups of guerilla fighters based in mountainous terrain could successfully inspire the 
populace of a given country to rise up against the government. The Soviets disliked this theory because the 
Communist Party did not have a role in it.  Mark N. Katz, “The Soviet-Cuban Connection,” International Security 8, 
no. 1 (1983): 88–112, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538487. 
 
 
4 Interview with Yuri Pavlov, February 21, 1999, Tape 10841, National Security Archive, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-18/pavlov1.html. 
 
5 In October 1969, Orlando Castro Hidalgo (of no relation to Fidel Castro), a former Cuban intelligence officer in 
France, testified to a U.S. Senate committee on the state of Soviet-Cuban relations. Once a committed revolutionary 
who dropped out of high school to fight in the Cuban Revolutionary War against Batista, Castro defected earlier that 
same year because he felt as though Cuba was becoming a Soviet satellite. In his testimony he relates that in the 
winter of 1968 all of the high-ranking members of the DGI (Directorio General de Inteligencia, the General 
Intelligence Directorate) were recalled to Havana in order to have Cuba’s new relationship with the Soviet Union 
explained to them. On its part, Moscow agreed to increase greatly Soviet technical assistance to Cuba in the areas of 
the armed forces, mineralogy, industry, agriculture, and intelligence, as well as increase shipments of raw materials, 
machinery and purchases of Cuban goods. Havana agreed to stop all public anti-Soviet pronouncements and to 
recognize the leadership of the CPSU in the world Communist movement. The information was not widely 
distributed and kept in strict secrecy, as Castro was not even allowed to tell his wife. Castro’s testimony is the only 
knowledge that exists of this agreement.  Orlando Castro Hidalgo, “Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate 
the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary: 
The Communist Threat to the United States and The Caribbean,” § Committee of the Judiciary (1970). 
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Cuban relations as by 1974 Moscow and Havana had resolved almost all of their differences. 
One significant disagreement, however, remained and transcended the improvement in relations: 
the issue of U.S.-Soviet détente. A relaxation in tensions between the socialist East and capitalist 
West, détente sought to improve cooperation and communication between Moscow and 
Washington, but in the end assumed that ongoing competition between the two superpowers 
would continue through more peaceful means, at least in Europe.6 Neither side, however, ceased 
to believe that it had the moral high ground or that it would eventually triumph.7 Because of 
Cuba’s history of U.S. neocolonial domination, Havana strongly disapproved of any 
rapprochement between Washington and Moscow. Worried about how independent minded 
Cuba might negatively impact a policy in which he had invested so much time and effort, 
Brezhnev visited Cuba to try to ensure détente’s success by reaffirming the Soviet-Cuban 
alliance and encouraging Castro to improve relations with the United States. On the penultimate 
day of the general secretary’s time on the “island of freedom,” Castro and Brezhnev signed the 
Joint Declaration, a document that endorsed détente. 
In this essay on Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba from January 28 to February 3, 1974, I aim to 
examine how détente affected the Soviet-Cuban relationship using the general secretary’s Cuban 
tour as a case study. I argue that Brezhnev, recognizing Cuba’s importance in maintaining 
détente with the United States, traveled to Cuba to ensure the success of this policy by 
strengthening the Soviet-Cuban alliance and assuaging Cuban fears of an American intervention. 
In fortifying the Soviet-Cuban alliance, Brezhnev further consolidated détente. I show that 
                                               
6 Adam Bromke and Derry Novak, “Introduction,” in The Communist States in the Era of Détente: 1971-1977, ed. 
Adam Bromke and Derry Novak (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978), 227-28. 
 
7 Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” in Brezhnev Reconsidered, ed. Edwin Bacon and Mark 
Sandle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 91-93. 
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Brezhnev succeeded in extracting a cautious public endorsement of détente from Havana and in 
doing so found the limits of Soviet influence on Cuban behavior. I also determine that the 
vicissitudes of détente ultimately served to reinforce the improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations 
that began in 1968. In responding to Cuban fears, Moscow further integrated Cuba politically 
and economically into the Soviet sphere, shown by Cuban admission into the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CEMA) and by Brezhnev’s visit Cuba in 1974. To support my argument, I 
utilize Soviet, Cuban, and American newspapers, Brezhnev’s and Castro’s speeches, memoirs of 
and interviews with Soviet and Cuban actors who participated in this event, Soviet and Cuban 
official reports on the visit, and a documentary film depicting Brezhnev’s time in Cuba. In 
addition, I examine declassified State Department and C.I.A. documents relating to Brezhnev’s 
visit that have not yet been tapped by historians of Soviet or Cuban foreign policy who have 
written on this topic.  
Indeed, few historians have examined the Soviet-Cuban relationship in any detail. Much 
of the work on this topic has been carried out by political scientists and international relations 
specialists.8 One central debate exists among scholars of the Soviet-Cuban relationship: what 
was the nature of the Soviet-Cuban alliance? Was Havana a compliant dependent of Moscow, 
simply following orders from the Kremlin, or did Cuba maintain a relatively independent foreign 
policy? One view, called the “surrogate thesis,” popular during the Cold War decades of the 
1960s, 70s, and 80s, posited that Havana was nothing more than a tool of the Kremlin owing to 
Cuba’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union.9 The opposing view, and the one upon which 
                                               
8 Historian Anne Gorsuch’s article on Soviet perceptions of Cuba in the early 1960s remains the only work that I am 
aware of on the cultural side of Soviet-Cuban relations.  Anne Gorsuch, “‘Cuba, My Love’: The Romance of 
Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties,” The American Historical Review 120, no. 2 (2015): 497-526. 
 
9 For an academic example of the surrogate thesis see Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of 
Latin America (Washington: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975) or  
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most scholars now agree, is that Cuba and the Soviet Union engaged in some kind of voluntary 
relationship based on mutual interests, each deriving benefits that were worth the cost of 
maintaining the alliance.10 Critics of the surrogate thesis point out that Castro, motivated by a 
determined sense of Cuban nationalism, has always had his own reasons for supporting Soviet 
foreign policy and at times this support has been guarded and not immediately forthcoming. 
Advocates of the surrogate thesis use developments in Cuban domestic politics, such as the 
sovietization of Cuban domestic political and economic structures, to demonstrate Cuban 
submission to Moscow’s will.11 In reality, as international relations specialists such as Mervyn J. 
Bain have pointed out, the Cuban leadership has always had its own domestic reasons to pursue 
such courses of action. In this case, solidifying the organization of the Cuban state ensured the 
Revolution would survive Fidel Castro’s death and made the economy, which until 1971 was an 
unmitigated disaster, more efficient and rational.12 In his memoirs, the Soviet Ambassador to the 
United States from 1962-1986 Anatolii Dobrynin complained about how Cuba was perceived in 
the U.S. as a Soviet pawn, saying that “the myth of Cuba as a Soviet proxy was especially 
                                               
 G.W. Sand, Soviet Aims in Central America: The Case of Nicaragua (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989). For an 
example of the surrogate thesis in the U.S. press, see “The Enslaved,” Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, January 30, 1974. 
 
10 W. Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1985); Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance. 
 
11 From roughly 1971 to 1975 Castro and the leadership shifted away from the highly personalized style of rule that 
they had relied upon since the 1959 Revolution and toward an institutionalization of political and economic 
structures along Soviet lines with Cuban peculiarities. It is important to recognize, as feminist scholar Margaret 
Randall points out, that while in many ways Cuban adopted a Soviet system, in areas such as literature and the arts 
the majority of Cubans rejected Stalinism despite attempts from within the leadership to impose it.  
Margaret Randall, Exporting Revolution: Cuba’s Global Solidarity (Duke University Press, 2017), 10-12.  
 
12 Mervyn Bain, Moscow and Havana 1917 to the Present: An Enduring Friendship in an Ever-Changing Global 
Context (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2019), 31, 121. 
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damaging for us in America, where the Cuban crisis of 1962 had fixed the idea firmly.”13 My 
research on Brezhnev’s 1974 visit to Cuba supports these assessments.   
Regarding Brezhnev’s visit specifically, several scholars have touched on it in 
monographs on Soviet-Cuban relations.14 Generally, they interpret Brezhnev’s trip to Cuba as a 
new high point in Soviet-Cuban relations, the culmination of a period of rapprochement that 
began in 1968. Political scientist W. Raymond Duncan sees the week that Brezhnev spent there 
as highlighting the importance of Cuba within Soviet foreign policy. Economist and historian of 
Cuba Carmelo Mesa-Lago paints Brezhnev’s visit as an event that “consolidated the new stage of 
the Cuban Revolution [sovietization] and showed how Soviet influence had contributed to shape 
that stage.”15   
As former Soviet diplomat and historian Yuri Pavlov notes, however, Castro’s 
agreements to toe the Soviet party line on détente seemed to be little more than surface level 
concessions. Pavlov emphasizes that Havana continued to support revolutionary forces in Latin 
America, although these activities had been significantly curtailed by 1974.16 International 
relations scholar Mervyn J. Bain suggests that Castro used the occasion of Brezhnev’s visit to 
assert that the Cuban Revolution possessed a unique and storied revolutionary heritage separate 
                                               
13 Anatolii Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986), 1st 
ed. (New York: Times Books, Random House, 1995), 367. 
 
14  Bain, Moscow and Havana 1917 to the Present; Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba; H. Michael Erisman, 
Cuba’s International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (London: Westview Press, 1985); 
Jacques Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical Perspectives, 1959-77 
(New York: Praeger, 1978); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization, rev. ed. 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978); Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance; Peter Shearman, The Soviet 
Union and Cuba, Chatham House Papers 38 (London; New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987). 
 
15 Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, 25.  
 
16Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 95.  
 
 7 
from the Soviet Union’s legacy.17 Political scientist Jacques Levesque sees Brezhnev’s visit as a 
sign indicating the massive improvement of Soviet-Cuban relations. In this regard, Brezhnev’s 
trip not only strengthened Soviet-Cuban ties but also brought Cuba into détente while 
maintaining friendly relations with Washington. Brezhnev’s trip marked the boundaries of 
detente while maintaining friendly relations with the United States. Brezhnev’s presence in Cuba 
consolidated the Soviet-Cuban relationship and his reassuring words boosted Castro’s confidence 
in the Soviet commitment to defend Cuba.18 My study of Brezhnev’s visit to Cuba largely 
confirms both Pavlov’s and Levesque’s assessments.  
In order to understand the context around Brezhnev’s visit, it is important to recognize 
the underlying disagreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union over détente and the differing 
Soviet and Cuban outlooks on international politics from which this disagreement stemmed. 
Both countries professed adherence to a common doctrine, Marxism-Leninism, and each sought 
to build an egalitarian society free from what they considered to be the oppression and injustice 
of the capitalist world. That said, Cuba and the Soviet Union experienced and interpreted the 
world of international relations differently and were influenced by their own historical 
circumstances.19 A long history of foreign domination and colonialism had taught Cubans that 
the world was divided into the Global North and the Global South. Yes, the Cold War was 
important and certainly shaped Havana’s decision-making process. However, the focus of Cuban 
leaders remained on maintaining an independent Cuban state and what the U.S. condescendingly 
                                               
17 Bain, Moscow and Havana 1917 to the Present, 121. 
 
18 Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, 180-82. 
 
19 Both Duncan and Shearman highlight the different Soviet and Cuban foreign policy motivations and underlying 
principles. Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba, 193; Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba, 77-78. 
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called the “export of revolution.”20 Informed by a uniquely strong sense of Cuban identity and 
centuries of colonial domination, independence and internationalism became integral values of 
the Cuban Revolution.21 Through military, educational, and medical aid programs, Cubans 
demonstrated that they saw international politics as a North-South struggle, although at times 
Cuban leaders had to compromise on these principles in order maintain good relations with the 
Soviet Union, on which they relied for the economic vitality that made the achievement of these 
more important goals possible.22 Cuban leaders saw preserving strong ties with Moscow as 
essential in large part because they saw Cuban independence as firmly dependent on the Soviet-
Cuban alliance and on the Soviet resolve to maintain it, which it feared had weakened as a result 
of détente’s advance.23 As a March 1973 C.I.A. intelligence report commented, “although Castro 
has paid lip service to Moscow’s détente policy, he and other Cuban leaders have occasionally 
made indirect criticisms along the line that ‘imperialism’s apparent cooperation … is deceptive 
and false in the long run.’”24 Havana’s chief enemy in the struggle against the Global North was 
the United States. Castro feared aggression from Washington for good reason, having already 
repelled one U.S. invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. 
                                               
20 Randall, Exporting Revolution, 1-2. 
 
21 Ibid., 4; Erisman, Cuba’s International Relations, 4. 
 
22 The Cuban leadership supported several Soviet causes that damaged its credentials as an anti-imperialist country, 
including Fidel Castro’s endorsement of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Castro’s strong 
denunciation of the theory of two imperialisms, which argued that both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
in fact imperialist powers, in favor of the Soviet Union at the 1973 Nonaligned Conference, and Cuban support for 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Nature and Uses of the Soviet-Cuban 
Connection,” in The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship, ed. Eusebio Mujal-León (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), 176-77. 
  
23 Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, 15. 
 




 On a larger scale, Cuba and most other Latin American countries experienced a 
fundamentally different Cold War than the Soviet Union and Europe did. The second half of the 
20th century saw horrendous violence in all parts of Latin America, often caused by endogenous 
factors influenced by the international Cold War climate and exacerbated by Soviet and U.S. 
backing of local actors to suit their own interests.25 Détente hardly seemed to restrain 
Washington’s overt and covert actions in the Global South, as the Vietnam War, the 1973 CIA 
backed coup in Chile, U.S. support for the ultra violent dictatorships of Argentina and Uruguay, 
and aid to repressive Central American governments all demonstrated. From the Cuban 
perspective, Moscow had already forsaken several countries of the Global South, such as 
Vietnam, out of fear that such support might upend the fragile détente process.26 
The view from the Kremlin, however, was different. Historian Vladislav Zubok coined 
the term “revolutionary-imperial paradigm” to explain Soviet foreign policy. Soviet leaders 
played the game of global power politics, he argues, striving for security and power for the 
Soviet state.27 In this struggle Soviet leaders were motivated by Marxism-Leninism, an ideology 
that preached that the world’s extant political systems would be overturned by the coming 
revolution that would enthrone a dictatorship of the proletariat. Soviet leaders paradoxically 
subscribed to this revolutionary ideology while at the same time acting pragmatically like a 
“normal” powerful state on the international stage by constructing an empire in Eastern Europe 
and Asia while seeking to expand Soviet influence wherever possible. Soviet leaders defined 
                                               
25 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011), 3-4. 
 
26 Antoni Kapcia, Cuba in Revolution: A History since the Fifties (London: Reaktion, 2008), 121. 
 
27 Vladislav Zubok, Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), x.  
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international affairs as a struggle between the socialist East and the capitalist West, a struggle 
that had nearly proven catastrophic for the world’s population in the October 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis. The Soviet leadership of the post-Khrushchev era gravitated toward détente in 
part as a conservative reaction to what they saw as Khrushchev’s brinksmanship in the 
Caribbean. Détente received strong support from Brezhnev himself, who saw the achievement of 
this policy as the fulfillment of his own lifelong dream of securing peace.28 Détente clearly 
served Soviet superpower interests by enabling Moscow to engage in foreign trade, legitimizing 
it as a superpower equal to the United States, and allowing it to consolidate its empire in Europe, 
and guarantee post-WWII borders there.29  
While the Soviet leadership proved to be immanently practical in many areas, Cuba 
always was a decidedly emotional issue for almost all Soviet citizens. The interviewees in Soviet 
Baby Boomers, by historian Donald J. Raleigh, relate that the Cubans, especially Fidel Castro 
himself, inspired many Soviet people with revolutionary fervor and excitement, a feeling that a 
generation of Soviet citizens born after the 1917 October Revolution and formative wars of the 
first half of the 20th century had never felt before. Raleigh posits that the Cuban Revolution 
“allowed Soviet citizens to vicariously relive their own revolution.”30 In their evaluation of the 
Soviet 1960s, Soviet journalists and writers Petr Vail’ and Alexander Genis write that “the 
Cuban Revolution became a bright event for the Soviet people of the 60s: the powerful, creative 
impulse of social upheaval linked to a romantic, attractive, faraway ocean.”31 Politburo member 
                                               
28 Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s,” Cold War History, no. 4 (2008): 432. 
 
29 Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” 91-93. 
 
30 Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia’s Cold War Generation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 151. 
 
31 Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr Genis, 60-ye. Mir sovetskogo cheloveka (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis Publishers, 1989), 
44. 
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Anastas Mikoyan once said that “‘you Americans must realize what Cuba means to us old 
Bolsheviks. We have been waiting all our lives for a country to go communist without the Red 
Army. It has happened in Cuba, and it makes us feel like boys again.’”32 This emotional reaction 
that Cuba elicited certainly contributed to the fact that Moscow continued to support Havana 
even when Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were making public pronouncements against Soviet 
doctrine in the mid 1960s and despite the fact that Moscow’s Cuban connection complicated 
détente to a significant degree.33  
In regard to Brezhnev’s attitudes toward Cuba, we learn from the memoir of his assistant, 
Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, that Brezhnev tried to maintain good relations with Cuba while 
keeping the island at arm’s length for fear of antagonizing Washington.34 This is because Cuba 
had always been a poignant issue for U.S. politicians and their innately emotional and at times 
irrational Cuban policies made the island a potential graveyard for détente. As Wayne S. Smith, a 
former U.S. diplomat in Cuba, opined in 1982, “Cuba continues to have much the same effect on 
United States Administrations that the full moon reputedly had on werewolves.”35 Historian 
Louis Pérez highlights the emotional quality of American policy toward Cuba, arguing that “the 
issue of US relations with Cuba under Fidel Castro early ceased to be a matter of rational policy 
                                               
32 Samuel Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), 147. 
 
33 Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Nature and Uses of the Soviet-Cuban Connection,” in The USSR and Latin America: A 
Developing Relationship, ed. Eusebio Mujal-León (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 161-62. 
 
34 A. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: vospominaniia diplomata, sovetnika A.A. Gromyko, 
pomoshchnika L.I. Brezhneva, Iu.V. Andropova, K.U. Chernenko i M.S. Gorbacheva (Moskva: Mezhdunar. 
otnosheniia, 1994), 174-75. 
 
35 Wayne S. Smith, “It Is Not Impossible to Deal with Castro: Realism Is Required,” The New York Times, 




calculation and passed into the realm of pathology.”36 The issue of Cuba complicated the détente 
process because Havana took it as a given that it would support national liberationist movements 
throughout Latin America and the Global South. This angered Washington and threatened 
détente because many Washington politicians saw Cuba as a Soviet proxy.37 Moscow had to 
cope with a nationalistic Cuban foreign policy over which the Kremlin had little control while 
dealing with an American government that thought otherwise. The issue of Cuba had already 
threatened détente once, during the 1970 Cienfuegos Crisis.38 Brezhnev understood how 
explosive an issue Cuba could be, and therefore treated Cuba with extreme caution, trying to 
distance himself from Castro while continuing to give robust support to the Cuban economy in 
order to avoid entanglements with Washington.39 After experiencing WWI as a child, WWII as a 
soldier, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 as a member of the Politburo, Brezhnev tried to 
avoid another major war at all costs.40 U.S. policies and attitudes toward Cuba, therefore, played 
an important limiting factor on how Brezhnev could act in regard to Cuba.  
                                               
36 Louis A. Pérez, “Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy Toward Cuba,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies 34, no. 2 (2002): 250. 
 
37 Erisman, Cuba’s International Relations, 3-7. 
 
38 The point at issue emerged in September 1970 when Washington believed that overflights of Cuban territory had 
picked up evidence of a Soviet submarine base under construction in Cienfuegos, a port city in south-central Cuba. 
These developments were unacceptable to Washington, which viewed any Soviet base to be a violation of the 1962 
understanding reached between Moscow and Washington. It is not at all clear that the Soviet Navy had attempted to 
build any kind of base in Cienfuegos and Soviet diplomatic staff were in fact puzzled at Washington’s reaction. 
While American and Soviet diplomats were trying to negotiate behind closed doors in order to avoid a public 
spectacle, Henry Kissinger, U.S. National Security Advisor, informed Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatolii 
Dobrynin in September, 1970, that that ‘the U.S. Government treats this whole matter of the base with the utmost 
seriousness from the standpoint of the further development of Soviet-U.S. relations.’ Soviet-American Relations: 
The Détente Years, 1969-1972, eds. David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 2007), Document 84. 
 
39Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva,174-75. 
 
40 Donald J. Raleigh, “‘Soviet’ Man of Peace: Leonid Il´ich Brezhnev and His Diaries,” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 17, no. 4 (2016): 843. 
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Brezhnev demonstrated his desire to support Cuba at a comfortable distance as the 
development of U.S.-Soviet détente accelerated. Moscow sought to strengthen economic and 
political ties with Cuba, which served the dual purpose of increasing Soviet influence over 
Cuban economic and political institutions and increasing the efficiency of the Cuban economy as 
well as easing Cuban fears over détente. In 1970 the two countries founded the 
Intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological 
Cooperation and in July 1972, soon after the first Nixon-Brezhnev Summit in Moscow that May, 
Cuba became the first non-European member of the Soviet-led CEMA.41 Although it is likely 
that Havana would have preferred entry into the Warsaw Pact over CEMA in order to increase its 
security against potential U.S. aggression, any military cooperation between Cuba and the Soviet 
Union would have antagonized Washington and jeopardized detente.42 
By the second Nixon-Brezhnev Summit in June 1973, U.S.-Soviet relations had greatly 
improved and détente reigned in Europe. At that point, Brezhnev chose to accept a long-standing 
invitation from Castro to visit Cuba.43 He informed Nixon of his intentions at the 1973 summit.44 
On July 10, less than one month after Brezhnev had returned to Moscow from Washington, a 
Pravda article announced Brezhnev would go to Cuba sometime in October that year.45 In 
                                               
41Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, 166-67. 
 
42 Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, 17. 
 
43 Ibid., 23. 
 
44 In a discussion with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on December 22, 1973, Henry Kissinger refers to a 
conversation Brezhnev had with President Nixon during the summit. Brezhnev apparently told Nixon that he was 
going to Cuba to promote a better climate for relations between the United States and Cuba.  “Middle East; U.S.-
GDR Relations; Summit Preparations; SALT; CSCE; MBFR; Trade; Brezhnev Visit to Cuba; Pompidou and Brandt 
Visits to USSR [Meeting with Andrei Gromyko]” (National Security Archive, December 22, 1973), Accession 




45 “O vizite tov. L. I. Brezhneva na Kubu,” Pravda, July 10, 1973. 
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October 1973, after Brezhnev’s visit had been delayed, a State Department memo remarked that 
“probably Castro needs coddling following another high-level US Soviet summit meeting.”46 
The same memo noted that it was extremely unusual for the general secretary to have his travel 
plans announced so far in advance and that it was possible this announcement was meant to 
console Havana after a successful U.S.-Soviet summit.  
A little more than a month before Brezhnev left for Havana, the general secretary instructed 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to communicate the purpose of his visit to Cuba to President 
Nixon. On December 22, 1973, Gromyko met with Henry Kissinger. The Soviet foreign minister 
wanted to make sure that President Nixon was aware that the general secretary would be 
traveling to Cuba in January 1974. The visit would not come across as overtly anti-American and 
no new significant economic agreements would be signed, the Soviet foreign minister promised 
his American counterpart. Gromyko assured Kissinger that the visit “will not in the slightest way 
have any anti-American character. On the contrary, it will promote, as we see it, a better climate 
for relations between Cuba and the United States.”47 Kissinger cordially received the news and 
told the Soviet foreign minister that Nixon would appreciate it. The U.S. Secretary of State later 
reciprocated by ordering all American covert operations to cease for the duration of Brezhnev’s 
time in Cuba and then informing Ambassador Dobrynin of his actions.48 In order to reinforce to 
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President Nixon that his visit was not a threat to U.S.-Soviet ties, Brezhnev sent a message to 
President Nixon on January 28 while he was flying past the East coast of the U.S. en route to 
Havana communicating the general secretary’s desire that relations between Moscow and 
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                                            BREZHNEV IN CUBA 
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev received a hero’s welcome on January 28, 1974, at 
3:15 p.m. when he and his entourage landed at Joe Martí International Airport outside of Havana 
to great fanfare. As he stepped out of the airplane, Brezhnev greeted the tumultuous mass by 
heartily shouting “Viva Cuba!” (long live Cuba!) three times. Visibly thrilled as the crowd 
readily responded to the traditional Spanish blessing by shouting “Viva!”, Brezhnev descended 
the stairs from the plane as the crowd of Cubans chanted “Brezhnev, Brezhnev, Brezhnev!,” all 
the while waiving Soviet and Cuban flags.50 Cuban leader Fidel Castro warmly greeted the 
general secretary at the bottom of the staircase. Brezhnev, all smiles, give a warm hug to Castro, 
dressed as always in his olive-green army uniform, who happily reciprocated. The cheers 
continued as Cuban leaders, including Minister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro and President 
Oswaldo Dorticós welcomed Soviet Politburo members Andrei Gromyko, the minister of foreign 
affairs, and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Vladimir Shcherbitskii, among 
others, who accompanied Brezhnev on his historic visit.51 
Granma, the official press organ of the Cuban Central Committee, ecstatically hailed 
Brezhnev’s arrival. “It is happiness, enormous and immense, that dominates everything,” one 
journalist adamantly declared.52  Soviet and Cuban journalists proudly wrote that over one 
                                               
50 Iu. Monglovskii, Dobro pozhalovat’- govorit Kuba.., 1974, https://www.net-film.ru/film-7489. 
 
51 Other notable members of Brezhnev’s entourage included First Secretary of Leningrad Grigorii Romanov, Central 
Committee Secretary Konstantin Katushev, Secretary of Civil Aviation Boris Bugaev, Vice-President of the State 
Committee of Foreign Economic Relations Ivan Arkhipov, and the Director General of the Soviet news agency 
TASS, Leonid Zamiatin.  
 
52 Julio Garcia, “Cincuenta Lineas,” Granma, January 29, 1974. 
 17 
million Cubans came from different parts of the island to welcome Brezhnev. Many of them 
lined the thirty-kilometer route between José Martí International Airport and the city center of 
Havana and cheered as Brezhnev and Castro rode by in a convertible.53 The next day Brezhnev 
and Castro were due to speak in Havana at the Plaza of the Revolution, notable as the location of 
many of Castro’s speeches and a monument to José Martí, considered by Cubans to be the father 
of the Cuban nation. To assure that the speeches would be well attended, the entire back page of 
the January 28 edition of Granma urged Cubans to come to the Plaza of the Revolution the next 
day in order to “participate in the mass act to testify to the dear visitor the profound sentiments of 
friendship, gratitude and revolutionary brotherhood” that united the Cuban and Soviet peoples. 
“The slogan is: one million in the plaza!”54 
The general secretary began his first full day in Havana by laying a huge wreath of red 
flowers at the monument of José Martí in the Plaza of the Revolution. Brezhnev and Castro then 
went into negotiations. While neither the Soviet, nor the Cuban presses reported what transpired 
in this or in any session of talks, Soviet papers communicated that Brezhnev recounted to Castro 
all of the latest developments in the Soviet Union, including the 24th Party Congress in 1971 in 
which Brezhnev had taken charge of Soviet foreign policy and publicly promoted détente for the 
first time.55 Later that day the Cuban people amassed in the Plaza of the Revolution for the 
premier event of Brezhnev’s visit in what the Soviet documentary film called “a powerful 
manifestation of the unbreakable union between the CPSS (Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union) and the Communist Party of Cuba.”56 That evening both Brezhnev and Castro spoke to 
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the enormous crowd of Cubans, many of whom had donned red hats and were waving Soviet and 
Cuban flags. These speeches are especially important as sources in the account of Brezhnev’s 
trip because, along with the Joint Declaration signed at the end of the visit, they are the only 
public pronouncements coming directly from the Soviet and Cuban leadership through which we 
can ascertain the Soviet and Cuban policy positions and the progress of negotiations between the 
two parties that took place during Brezhnev’s visit. Both Cuban and Soviet newspapers mention 
repeatedly that both parties negotiated every day, but we are not privy to their content or 
outcomes except through these sources. As both speeches were printed in their entirety in Cuban 
and Soviet newspapers, were translated into English by a Cuban publisher, and received the 
lion’s share of coverage related to the visit in the international press, we can tell what Brezhnev 
and Castro thought important for their peoples and more importantly for the world to know.57  
Détente is a prominent theme of both the speeches and Joint Declaration precisely because those 
two events received the most international attention.  Brezhnev’s speech was indeed prepared in 
advance in Moscow with an awareness that the general secretary’s words would affect the 
international perception of Cuba.58  
 Speaking first, Fidel Castro recounted the story of the Cuban Revolution, highlighting 
the crucial Soviet role in Cuba’s development and the two countries’ common revolutionary 
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heritage while also reminding Brezhnev that Cuba had a unique revolutionary heritage stretching 
back to the 19th century.59 Praise for détente was forthcoming, but not plentiful. “Never like 
today, of course, has Soviet power had the great possibility to influence the world affairs in favor 
of peace, because never like today has the correlation of forces been so favorable to the 
revolutionary movement and international progressives.”60 Castro couched his recognition of 
détente within praise for Soviet military strength and the crisis of capitalism that Castro believed 
to be looming. “The peace program of the 24th Congress of the CPSU gains a special 
importance, as well as the efforts which you are making personally in favor of international 
détente.”61 The current correlation of forces would allow the socialist countries to get down to 
the real problems of the modern capitalist world order: hunger, disease, illiteracy, and 
underdevelopment. By referencing the problems of the Global South, Castro integrated détente 
into the extant Cuban North-South outlook on international politics, arguing that in the end 
détente was justified because it would help Cubans on their revolutionary mission to free the 
Global South from exploitation. The Cuban leader did not fail to mention the possibility of 
American intervention, saying that “in the arsenal of imperialist methods there still remains 
military aggression.”62  
As night fell, Leonid Brezhnev stepped up to the podium wearing a white panama hat that 
Castro had given him for the sun. The crowd, a heaving sea of red Soviet flags and red-blue 
striped Cuban flags, erupted as Brezhnev leaned into the microphone and bellowed “Viva Cuba!” 
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once again.63 In his speech, Brezhnev painted a picture of fraternal Cuban and Soviet peoples 
striving toward a common goal, communism, achieving one success after another. Carefully 
walking the line between extolling détente and improved U.S.-Soviet relations while ensuring the 
Cubans that the Soviet Union would stand behind them with military force if necessary, 
Brezhnev articulated his vision of détente and peaceful coexistence to the crowd as “a struggle of 
lasting peace” that will “eradicate wars of aggression from the life of humanity forever.”64 The 
period of respite offered by this peace was an opportunity for socialism to develop and advance. 
He lent credence to his arguments by quoting Cuban revolutionary hero and writer José Martí. 
“‘The future of mankind is peace,’ said that glorious son of Cuba, José Martí.” “War, which in 
the past was the first recourse, is now the last. Tomorrow, it will be a crime.”65 The general 
secretary endorsed the Soviet understanding of detente, which included “the right of the people 
of the socialist countries to build a new society without foreign interference of any kind.”66 The 
concept of peaceful coexistence with the United States, however, did not mean that Moscow was 
going to stop supporting its allies, 
Brezhnev emphasized that “we are not pacifists. We are absolutely against peace at any 
price.”67 Brezhnev deployed rhetoric such as this to assuage Cuban fears by assuring the 
onlookers that although Moscow advocated for peace and a better relationship between East and 
West, the Soviets still carried a big stick. Détente meant a reduction in tensions, but Brezhnev’s 
comments demonstrate that it was oxymoronically based upon a vast and equal buildup of 
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military forces, effectively a peace built on goodwill as well as guns. Brezhnev’s comments 
gained him cheers from the Cuban crowd as he clearly indicated Soviet support for Cuba.  
After this strong language on the Soviet willingness to use force, Brezhnev defended the 
recent thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations in the context of the ever-present threat of an all-consuming 
nuclear war, doing his best to sell the policy of Peaceful Coexistence, a concept he had borrowed 
from Khrushchev, to the Cuban people. Peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries did not 
prohibit Moscow from supporting national liberation movements in the Global South.68 As 
Brezhnev argued, the 1973 agreement against the use of nuclear weapons that Brezhnev and 
Nixon concluded at the second Nixon-Brezhnev Summit that year went a long way toward 
eliminating the threat of nuclear war to all peoples.69 The fact that improved relations with the 
United States would also help the socialist nations reach other long-standing goals, as it had 
helped end the Vietnam War and conflict in the Middle East, was “indisputable.” “In this way,” 
Brezhnev went on to assert, “one could say that the improvement already begun in Soviet-
American relations is useful for universal peace.” “We will push forward along our line of 
principles” as long as the United States reciprocated in kind.70  
Both speeches represent a delicate balancing act. For Castro, détente was something he 
had to endorse because of the alliance with the Soviets. The terms of this alliance did not 
mandate that Havana and Moscow agree on every single matter in international politics; it only 
required them to outwardly demonstrate solidarity with each other. Therefore, Castro 
begrudgingly endorsed détente, but in doing so integrated it into the Cuban worldview in which 
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internationalism and solidarity were integral parts.71 Brezhnev’s speech represented a bid to 
strike a precarious midline between endorsing détente and expressing support and solidarity with 
Cuba. While exalting détente and defending U.S.-Soviet rapprochement he made clear the Soviet 
Union’s readiness to defend its Cuban ally with force of arms if necessary.  
Soviet and Cuban press coverage of both speeches pushed the same themes: the crowd 
enthusiastically received both speakers and their respective messages. The footage of Brezhnev’s 
speech in the Soviet documentary of the visit was heavily edited in order to show that the crowd 
gave applause when détente was mentioned when they actually did not.72 It was obviously 
important for Soviet citizens to understand that the Cubans in the Plaza of the Revolution 
wholeheartedly supported Brezhnev and détente. In its coverage Granma clearly communicated 
Castro’s new approval of détente through the excerpts from Brezhnev and Castro’s speeches 
printed on the front page of the January 30 edition. Echoing Castro’s speech, Granma 
emphasized that détente meant freedom from foreign interference (read: U.S. intervention), a 
freedom guaranteed by Soviet arms.73 The February 8 edition of the Cuban weekly magazine 
Bohemia reiterated the same theme.74 
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Soviet media outlets hailed Brezhnev’s speech as a considerable contribution to 
international peace. The official Russian-language account of Brezhnev’s visit highlights the 
enthusiastic reception of Brezhnev’s speech among the Cuban populace, stating that the gigantic 
crowd composed of “the heroic Cuban people warmly expressed . . . their firm resolve to 
strengthen and deepen this friendship and cooperation, moving together on the same side of the 
path of peace, progress and socialism.”75 Articles in Soviet newspapers communicated a similar 
theme, focusing on the overwhelmingly favorable reactions of Cuban citizens to Brezhnev’s 
speech.76  
U.S. and international press sources focused on different aspects of Brezhnev’s pro-
détente message. The New York Times reported on Brezhnev’s assertion that Cuba was not a 
strategic base of Soviet influence, a message that seemed to be aimed at ensuring Washington 
that the Soviet presence in Cuba was not a security threat for the U.S.77 Other U.S. journalists 
interpreted Brezhnev’s speech as a call for Cuba to improve relations with the United States.78 
One British news outlet underscored the parts of Brezhnev’s speech that advocated against the 
international arms race.79 The South China Morning Post, an English-language paper published 
in Hong Kong, choose to stress Fidel Castro’s embrace of détente.80 Brezhnev, understanding 
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that his audience consisted of much more than the Cuban crowd in front of him, had clearly 
succeeded in projecting his message to Washington and beyond and therefore also in promoting 
detente.   
Although the most publicized moment of the visit came at the beginning, Brezhnev’s 
time in Cuba was far from over. Before considering the Joint Declaration that capped Brezhnev’s 
Cuban tour, I will examine the remainder of the general secretary’s visit. Brezhnev’s and 
Castro’s speeches and the Joint Declaration both dealt with détente in accordance with their 
intended broad international audience. What took place during the middle of Brezhnev’s visit, 
however, received little coverage from U.S. and international outlets and emphasized the 
strengthening of Soviet-Cuban relations that Brezhnev’s trip symbolized while mostly avoiding 
U.S.-Soviet détente. While the actual intent of these activities and rationale behind their planning 
in the minds of the Soviet visitors and Cuban hosts remains unknown, it is clear that the bulk of 
Brezhnev’s visit emphasized the strong state of the Soviet-Cuban alliance. Brezhnev’s week-long 
sojourn went a long way toward cultivating this sense of unity, while his actions reinforced it. In 
engaging in ceremonies and cultural events that called attention to the extent of Soviet economic 
aid to Cuba and that referenced their common experiences as socialist nations that successfully 
fought revolutionary struggles, Brezhnev succeeded in building up the Soviet-Cuban alliance and 
therefore in reinforcing détente.  
The negotiations continued on the morning of January 30, with Brezhnev’s entire 
entourage present on the Soviet side, while Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós and Minister of 
the Armed Forces Raúl Castro accompanied Fidel Castro. Later that day Dorticós presented 
Brezhnev with the Order of José Martí, the highest honor of the Cuban state, at a ceremony in the 
Palace of the Revolution, the official residence of the president of Cuba and site of formal state 
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functions. Both Cuban and Soviet pronouncements at the ceremony demonstrated that they 
believed Brezhnev’s visit strengthened Soviet-Cuban relations. Two days before Brezhnev’s 
arrival, the Cuban Council of Ministers unanimously agreed to bestow the order on Brezhnev in 
honor of his “internationalist solidarity” and “his friendship for the Socialist Revolution of 
Cuba.” The Council added that “your [Brezhnev’s] historic visit to our country constitutes a 
valiant and singular contribution to the development of relations between the peoples of the 
USSR and Cuba.” 81 In his acceptance speech, Brezhnev stated that “in this decoration I see, 
before everything else, a symbol of the strong and sincere friendship and indestructible fraternity 
that has been established between the Soviet Union and socialist Cuba.”82  
The main event of the next day, January 31, saw Brezhnev and Castro tour the newly 
built Vladimir Lenin Vocational School in Havana. According to the Cuban magazine Bohemia, 
the school was a symbol of Soviet aid to Cuba, having been constructed in a collaborative effort 
between Soviet and Cuban experts. Soviet pedagogical specialists made sure that the Cuban 
teachers were well trained and Soviet equipment made the science labs and classrooms perfect 
environments for learning.83 As he ended his speech at the school’s dedication ceremony, Fidel 
Castro applauded Brezhnev for his “brave struggle for world peace” and “feelings of friendship 
and affection for our revolutionary fatherland.”84  
Portrayals of Soviet economic subsidies to Cuba in the official Soviet documentary film 
on Brezhnev’s visit show how economically vigorous the Soviet-Cuban alliance was by 
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enumerating the different areas of the Cuban economy that Soviet technicians and technology 
had helped to modernize. Documentaries like this would have been shown in Soviet movie 
theaters before a feature film, suggesting that the representations of Cuba projected in the 
documentary were intended for the average Soviet citizen. In stressing the sizeable nature and 
scale of Soviet-Cuban economic cooperation, the film gives the viewer a vision of Cuba as a 
modernizing socialist island, full of enthusiastic and committed citizens who appreciated the aid 
given by the Soviet Union. As the narrator of the documentary film states, by 1974 “Soviet-
Cuban cooperation covers all the different areas of life” in Cuba. In an interview at a Havana 
metallurgical plant built with Soviet expertise, one worker expressed that Cubans were doing 
everything they could to build socialism and improve their friendship with the Soviet people. As 
the Soviet journal Latinskaia Amerika (Latin America) notes, several of the 8,000 Soviet experts 
that had traveled to Cuba since 1959 helped with the construction of new plants like the one 
featured in the documentary in order to process the nickel (an essential ingredient in steel) that 
was mined on the island.85 At a construction site one of the workers opined that “we are sure that 
Cuban-Soviet friendship helps us a lot to build socialism and communism. That is why we are 
extremely happy for Brezhnev’s visit.” The viewer is then taken to a sugar cane field, where the 
documentary plainly contrasts the old way of harvesting sugar cane by hand with machetes and 
the new Soviet combines, which easily sucked up the cane and deposited it in a trailing truck. 
The viewer learns that Soviet and Cuban engineers together have largely automated the process 
of harvesting sugar cane, making it much easier than before. Constructing an automated sugar 
cane harvester had been an especially difficult task for Soviet engineers because sugar cane did 
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not grow in the Soviet Union.86 This “economic cooperation” spread over every area of the 
Cuban economy, including geology, transport, energy, and chemicals.87 As exemplified in the 
documentary film, Cuba and the Soviet Union closely cooperated in all areas of economic 
development and Brezhnev’s visit served as a way to highlight this cooperation.  
A plethora of other events indicate a concerted effort to demonstrate the strength of 
Soviet-Cuban ties. Brezhnev agreed to aid Cuba in the exploitation of offshore oil resources and 
help develop Cuban civil aviation.88 The general secretary watched the Soviet National 
Basketball Team play against the Cuban national team (Cuba won), received gifts from Soviet 
and Cuban Young Pioneers (the equivalent of the Cub Scouts or Girl Scouts in the U.S.) in 
Santiago de Cuba, and paid a visit to the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society in Havana.  
Additionally, throughout Brezhnev’s visit both Soviet and Cuban sources referred 
consistently to the historical similarities between the Soviet and Cuban Revolutions and their 
common conflicts with the West. In the absence of any kind of cultural, linguistic, or religious 
links, these shared influences were able to become uniting themes that highlighted the few things 
that Cuba and the Soviet Union shared. While the most prominent mention of these motifs came 
in the hallmark speeches that Brezhnev and Castro gave in Havana on January 29, they represent 
recurring themes in the Soviet and Cuban media throughout Brezhnev’s visit. In referring to 
these uniting themes, press depictions reinforced Brezhnev’s attempts to strengthen the Soviet-
Cuban alliance.  
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Consumers of both Soviet and Cuban media would have picked up on the comparisons, 
as the following examples make clear. One article on the history of the Soviet Union during 
WWII, appearing in Granma just before Brezhnev’s arrival, seems to compare postwar Soviet 
history and postrevolutionary Cuban history. The article discusses the challenges faced by the 
Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of WWII, remarking that there was an “imperialist 
blockade” surrounding the Soviet Union and that the Soviet people were menaced by “the threats 
of the imperialists that built a cordon of military bases around the USSR and obligated the Soviet 
people to make gigantic efforts not only to rebuild their economy, but also to develop their 
defenses.”89 The language of imperialist blockades, military bases, and the description of Soviet 
experiences could easily have applied to Cuba. This article would certainly have reminded 
Cubans of the U.S. economic blockade against the island, beginning in 1960, and of the 
Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base, which the U.S. has illegally held since the Cuban Revolution. 
These kinds of press representations seem similar to portrayals of Cuba in the early 1960s Soviet 
press, where pictures of Cuban guerilla fighters and enormous cheering crowds celebrating the 
Revolution’s victory echoed pictures of the euphoric Soviet post-WWII celebrations.90 Cubans 
reading this article in 1974 would have understood that the United States was the enemy that 
both they and the Soviets shared.  
One example from the Soviet media of these recurring themes stands out. On February 2, 
Brezhnev and Castro traveled by plane to Santiago de Cuba on the eastern end of the island. 
Santiago was a natural destination for the Soviet entourage. Cuba’s second largest city, Santiago 
possessed a long tradition as a center of uprisings against the Spanish and American 
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governments and was in fact the location of Fidel Castro’s first failed attempt at revolution in 
July 1953. The residents of Santiago showed their appreciation toward Brezhnev by greeting him 
at the airport and lining his route from the airport to the city just as in Havana several days 
earlier. Even though a welcome banner stretching over the highway spelled his first name wrong 
(Leonod instead of Leonid), Brezhnev seemed to be grateful for the reception. In the Soviet 
documentary film, Brezhnev and Castro are shown visiting a house outside of Santiago that 
served as a site for storing arms during the Cuban Revolutionary War (1956-1959). While sitting 
on the low white stone well used to conceal the arms, Castro begins to tell Brezhnev of his 
experiences in the Cuban Revolutionary War. Footage of Castro, Che Guevara, and other Cuban 
guerilla combatants accompanied the Cuban leader’s story, giving Castro’s descriptions a visual 
representation. Brezhnev then reciprocates with his own war stories, regaling Castro of his time 
as a political officer on the Eastern Front of WWII.91 Images and short clips of Brezhnev from 
the Eastern Front begin to flit by. In the context of other efforts to connect the Cuban and Soviet 
experiences, this brief segment suggests that the two leaders’ involvements in the Cuban 
Revolutionary War and WWII were being equated. This portion of the film bears some similarity 
to what Anne Gorsuch describes in her article on Soviet cultural depictions of Cuba in the early 
1960s. As the Soviet press conveyed the 1959 Cuban Revolution to Soviet citizens, this event 
conjured up memories of important historical moments in Soviet history, such as the 1917 
Revolution, Soviet support for the socialists in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the Soviet 
victory in WWII.92 The difference is that the emotions Gorsuch describes appear to be more 
spontaneous in nature, while in this case the film makers are the ones drawing the connections 
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between the Cuban Revolution and WWII. These and other representations of the Soviet-Cuban 
alliance created commonalities between the two countries based on their revolutionary 
experiences and persecution by the West. Drawing these connections at a moment when all eyes 
in both Cuba and the Soviet Union were focused on Brezhnev and his visit would have ensured 
maximum exposure, helping to ensure the success of Brezhnev’s visit and his mission of 
strengthening Soviet-Cuban relations.  
On February 2, the night before Brezhnev’s departure, at the Palace of the Revolution 
both leaders sat down for the official signing ceremony of the joint Soviet-Cuban Declaration, a 
revealing source that shows what Havana and Moscow thought important for the world to see 
they agreed on.93 By virtue of the absences or the vagueness in language that appear, one can 
imply disagreements or lack of agreements from the two parties. A careful reading of the joint 
declaration suggests that Castro had indeed changed his opinions on détente, or at least what he 
chose to project to the outside world. The declaration also demonstrates some of the 
disagreements that lay under the surface of much flowery language and expressions of mutual 
solidarity.   
In general, the declaration promoted further Soviet-Cuban integration on the economic 
and political levels, gave guarded recognition to détente, expressed solidarity with nations of the 
Global South, and praised the sovietization of Cuba. Further economic and political integration 
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were specifically enumerated at length. Moscow commended Havana for holding the first 
conference of the PCC (Cuban Communist Party) and recognized Cuba’s importance and 
increasing prominence in the international arena, while Havana bowed to Soviet preeminence 
within the world communist movement. Brezhnev’s assistant Aleksandrov-Agentov noted that 
the document was written with one eye on Washington. In not touching any sensitive areas of 
U.S.-Soviet relations, Aleksandrov-Agentov remembers, the declaration tried to demonstrate that 
Soviet-Cuban relations were of no threat to Washington while strongly signifying continued 
Soviet support for Cuban socialism.94   
While it was only mentioned a handful of times, détente’s inclusion in the Joint 
Declaration is significant. The first page of the declaration makes clear that the leaders of both 
countries share their views of international politics and “the policy of fighting for the 
consolidation of peace and international collaboration.”95 The efforts of the socialist countries 
and other progressive forces had allowed détente to rise to prominence in international relations, 
leading to the consolidation of peace in international affairs, the declaration reports.96 While 
supporting détente, the declaration also condemns imperialist aggression. A State Department 
memo notes that the general agreement on the foreign policy of the socialist states left room for 
disagreement on specific issues while a different communique calls Cuban support for the 
improving U.S.-Soviet relationship “backhanded.”97 “Backhanded” support for Soviet foreign 
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policy actions, however, was nothing new. Castro had simultaneously criticized Moscow and 
supported the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia six years earlier. “Begrudged” probably 
would have described the situation more accurately. It is most probable that Castro never liked 
détente but, as in 1968, he understood the utility of publicly supporting Soviet initiatives, 
especially when public support seemed to be the only thing Moscow asked of him.98  
These concessions, however, were meaningful. Castro had gone from condemning 
détente to signing a declaration that endorsed it. In keeping with his long-standing hostility to 
any warming of U.S.-Soviet relations, Castro projected the appearance of agreement to the 
outside world. As former Soviet Diplomat in Latin America Yuri Pavlov mentions, “he [Castro] 
never renounced his views on the questionable value of superpower agreements on peaceful 
coexistence and disarmament for such small socialist countries as Cuba.”99 Furthermore, Castro 
and the Cuban leadership apparently refused to accept any kind of moderation in Cuban foreign 
policy that Brezhnev had urged Castro to adopt during the week’s negotiations.100 There is no 
evidence, other than Castro’s speeches and his signature on the Joint Declaration, that he gave 
anything other than a pro forma approval of détente. Feeling assured by newly guaranteed Soviet 
relationship and Cuba’s readmittance into the Latin American international community from 
1972-75,101 Castro’s new attitude reflects the embrace of what H. Michael Erisman calls a policy 
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of “selective détente,” which allowed Havana to pursue normalization of relations with the 
United States while supporting national liberation movements in the Global South.102  
As a February 11 State Department cable points out, Brezhnev must have been satisfied 
with Castro’s public embrace of his pet policy. Although Castro downplayed détente in an 
interview for the Soviet paper Izvestiia, the same cable notes, the Soviets had successfully pulled 
an endorsement of détente out of the Cubans in the Joint Declaration.103 With Cuba’s status as a 
Soviet ally reaffirmed by his efforts, Brezhnev had succeeded in pushing Castro and the Cuban 
leadership to accept what they had openly questioned only two years earlier. With Cuba now 
publicly accepting détente, the road was open to an improvement within U.S.-Cuban relations 
and a major obstacle for détente had been overcome.  
Further evidence of Castro’s tepid embrace of détente emerged in a July 1974 interview 
conducted by American reporters in Havana.104 When questioned about his opinions on 
improved U.S.-Soviet relations, Castro responded that “‘we trust them [The Soviets] completely, 
the loyalty of the Soviet leadership toward the Cuban revolution, and we have no concerns, [or] 
worries, on this subject.’”105 In fact, Castro said that “‘we can state that during this period when 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have relaxed, our relations with the 
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Soviet Union have improved. They are better than ever at this time.’”106 The reporter proceeded 
to ask Castro if he accepted the recent moves toward détente. The Cuban leader avoided giving a 
direct answer on his part and offered that “‘I think there has been a general acceptance of the 
policy of relaxation of tensions. We have lived in the past few years in a period of more peace 
and everyone has welcomed the end of the Cold War.’”107 Fidel Castro’s answer is revealing and 
supports the conclusion that he disapproved of détente.   
While demonstrating Castro’s new stance on détente, the Joint Declaration also hammered 
home the other important goal of Brezhnev’s visit: to strengthen Soviet-Cuban relations. One of 
the opening paragraphs declares that “during the visit there was manifested irrefutably one more 
time the indestructible union between the peoples of the USSR and Cuba and new avenues were 
opened to continue enlarging the fraternal collaboration between these two countries.”108 As one 
Soviet author asserted in 1987, the “Soviet-Cuban declaration mapped out an extensive program 
of further development of extensive cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of 
Cuba.”109 
The general secretary left Cuba as he had arrived: to the acclaim of a Cuban crowd. Again, a 
large mass assembled at the airport to see off the Soviet leader on February 3. Though it paled to 
the size of the multitude that had welcomed him, this smaller gathering of Cubans was no less 
enthusiastic. The Soviet documentary film shows that Fidel Castro, after hugging Brezhnev 
goodbye, seemed saddened as he watched the general secretary’s plane take off to Moscow.  
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Upon the delegation’s return, the Soviet Politburo officially approved of the results of 
Brezhnev’s visit, calling the Joint Declaration “a very important document that synthesizes the 
experience of fifteen years of a truly internationalist collaboration between the world’s first 
socialist country and the first socialist state of Latin America.” The announcement goes on to say 
that “the Soviet Union and Cuba, after declaring their decision to strengthen the general peace 
based on the principles of peaceful coexistence between states of different social systems, have 
reaffirmed that they are ready . . . to fight with persistence in order to consolidate these positive 
changes that have been produced in the international environment.”110 
Soviet scholars assessing the meaning of Brezhnev’s trip after the general secretary’s return 
home articulated the meaning of Brezhnev’s visit for détente and Soviet-Cuban relations. 
Latinskaia Amerika, issued six times annually in Russian since 1969, began publishing a Spanish 
edition on a quarterly basis in 1974, apparently to coincide with Brezhnev’s trip. The Spanish-
language version reached a large number of readers in over thirty-eight countries in Europe, 
North America, and Latin America.111 The first article of the first issue, “An Event of Global 
Scope,” projects the image of Soviet aid to Cuba that Moscow wanted the Spanish-speaking (and 
reading) world to see. The article uses Brezhnev’s visit as an advertisement for the Soviet model 
of development, heaping great praise on the sovietization of Cuban economic and political 
structures and paying special attention to Soviet economic assistance to Cuba.112 The Russian 
version of the same journal, Latinskaia Amerika, published several articles in its 1974 editions on 
Brezhnev’s Cuban tour. Articles such as “A Celebration of Fraternal Cuba” commend Soviet-
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Cuban cooperation, with cooperation meaning heavy Soviet economic subsidies, citing the fact 
that 8,000 Soviet technical experts had traveled to Cuba.113 In a volume on international 
cooperation between Cuba and the Soviet Union the author mentions Brezhnev’s visit as 
evidence that the two countries were committed to increasing their knowledge of each other and 
of increasing cooperation between their governments and societies.114 
Citing the effect of the general secretary’s time in Cuba on détente, an article in the Spanish 
edition of América Latina states that “Brezhnev’s visit had already become known around the 
world for its influence in strengthening world peace and international detente.”115  Another 
Soviet scholar in 1974 wrote of Brezhnev’s visit as “the expression of the indefatigable effort of 
Soviet communists and personally of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, aimed at expanding and 
deepening of the relaxation of international tension in its transformation in the irreversible 
process in accordance with the policy of peace of the 24th Congress of the CPSS.”116 After 
Brezhnev had returned on February 6, Izvestiia, in evaluating his visit, called Brezhnev’s trip to 
Cuba “a new investment in the matter of peace and socialism on our planet.”117 The certainty that 
Brezhnev’s visit had been “An Event of World Significance,” as the title to one Latinskaia 
Amerika article conveyed, seemed connected to broader Soviet foreign policy in Latin 
America.118 Another article in Latinskaia Amerika, “Soviet Foreign Policy and Latin America,” 
                                               
113 Novikov, “Prazdnik bratskoi Kuby,” 10. 
 
114 F. Grobarta and G. L. Simrnova, Internatsional’noe sotrudnichestvo KPSS i KP Kuby: Istoriia i sovremennost’ 
(Moskva: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), 128-29. 
 
115 Tsaregorodtsev, “Acontecimiento de alcance mundial,” 7. 
 
116 N. N. Chigirʹ, SSSR-Kuba: V edinom stroiu k obshchei tseli (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodnye 
Otnosheniia,” 1974), 60. 
 
117 “Vo imia nashego bratstva, radi mira na zemle: goriachee odobrenie itogov Vizita L. I. Brezhneva na Kubu,” 
Izvestiia, February 6, 1974. 
 
118 Vladimir Tsaregorodtsev, “Sobytie mirovogo znacheniia,” Latinskaia Amerika, no. 3 (1974): 6. 
 37 
explains to the reader that “the foreign policy course of the USSR, which is based on the 
principles of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence between states with different 
socioeconomic systems, answers completely to the national interests of the people of Latin 
American countries.”119 The release of the Spanish language version of Latinskaia Amerika in 
March 1974 also suggests that Brezhnev’s Cuban tour was connected in some way to larger 
Soviet foreign policy goals in Latin America.   
 Brezhnev’s visit became a touchstone in Soviet works on Soviet-Cuban relations. The 
placement of the many mentions of Brezhnev’s visit within these publications show us that it 
became a token representation that signified the strength of the Soviet-Cuban alliance. Several 
volumes on this topic begin with quotes from Brezhnev’s visit, including the edited volume 
Soviet-Cuban Relations: 1917-1977 and USSR-Cuba: On One Side with One Goal, which 
suggest the visit’s importance.120 The English-language publication USSR-Cuba: Friends 
Forever ends with an excerpt from one of Brezhnev’s Cuban speeches.121 As previously 
mentioned, the first Spanish edition of the Soviet journal Latin America was published on the 
heels of Brezhnev’s visit in March 1974, and begins with an article on Brezhnev’s visit.122 
U.S. and international newspapers as well as U.S. Government sources agreed that 
Brezhnev’s visit seemed to represent a success for détente. A State Department communique 
concludes that the “Soviets seem, at least, to have moved Fidel Castro a few notches in direction 
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of moderation” and that “Brezhnev is probably satisfied with the extent to which his Cuba visit . 
. . won Cuban adherence to such Soviet priorities as communist solidarity and détente.”123 An 
Israeli paper reported that “most observers in Havana believe that the talks between Castro and 
Brezhnev will result in a further alignment by Cuba to Soviet foreign policy and a strengthening 
















                                               
123 “Brezhnev Visit to Cuba: An Overview,” Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Moscow, February 11, 
1974), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974MOSCOW02017_b.html. 
 
124 “Brezhnev Ends Week in Cuba; Strengthened Ties Seen,” The Jerusalem Post (1950-1988); Jerusalem, Israel, 










A Soviet scholar writing in 1974 summed up Brezhnev’s visit as “the expression of the 
indefatigable effort of Soviet communists and personally of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, aimed at 
the expanding and deepening of the relaxation of international tension in its transformation in the 
irreversible process in accordance with the policy of peace of the 24th Congress of the CPSS.”125 
Indeed, sources from many facets of Brezhnev’s visit confirm that the general secretary sought to 
buttress détente through his 1974 Cuban tour. He accomplished this task by reinforcing the 
Soviet-Cuban alliance, a task toward which sources illustrate he devoted a large amount of his 
seven days on the “island of freedom.” With Cuban fears at least somewhat allayed, Fidel Castro 
endorsed détente. In this respect, Brezhnev’s visit was indeed a success. But what about the 
Soviet leader’s other stated goal of improving U.S.-Cuban relations?  
There is no evidence that Brezhnev’s trip improved U.S.-Cuban ties. As Brezhnev returned to 
Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko traveled to Washington from Havana. Many 
journalists suspected at the time that Gromyko would advocate for better U.S.-Cuban relations in 
talks with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, citing favorable coverage in the Soviet press 
for U.S. politicians who advocated for normalizing relations with Cuba.126 When questioned, 
both Kissinger and Gromyko defied the press’s expectations and denied speaking about Cuba 
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during the talks.127 Unrelatedly, U.S.-Cuban relations did, however, show signs of recovering in 
the immediate aftermath of Brezhnev’s visit after a clandestine initiative from Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger in April 1974. The two sides relayed messages through intermediaries whom 
Kissinger carefully choose to maintain plausible deniability, as he kept this back-channel 
diplomacy a secret from President Nixon.128 It seemed for a short while that U.S.-Cuban 
relations were actually headed toward normalization in early 1975, until Cuba landed troops in 
Angola in November in support of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA), a Communist rebel group with ties to the Soviet Union, against U.S. backed South 
African troops in the Angolan Civil War. Research conducted by historian Piero Gleijeses in the 
Cuban archives confirms that Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership made the decision to send 
troops to Southern Africa against Moscow’s advisement. Castro counted on Moscow to back him 
up and indeed the Soviet Union eventually followed Havana’s lead, stepping up its support of the 
MPLA as well.129 Cuban intervention in Angola shocked Washington and made any 
rapprochement impossible considering the domestic climate of U.S. politics, which had already 
begun turning against détente.130 The Cuban intervention in Angola put detente under even more 
pressure in Washington, as the U.S. saw Cuban support for the Angolan MPLA as a Soviet 
intervention.131 In the end, Havana deemed support for the MPLA to be more important than 
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improved relations with Washington, refusing to compromise on its internationalist principles in 
order to save rapprochement with the United States.132 What remains unclear, however, is 
whether or not this brief upward trend in U.S.-Cuban ties was related to Brezhnev’s visit.  
As for the effect of détente on the Soviet-Cuban alliance, the reduction in superpower 
tensions proved to be a catalyst for further strengthening of ties between Moscow and Havana. 
As détente progressed, Havana protested. Understanding that the Cold War was anything but 
cold in the Global South, Havana feared that détente would only weaken Soviet resolve to defend 
Cuba. Brezhnev appeased Cuban fears of potential American aggression by further integrating 
Cuba politically and economically into the Soviet sphere, shown by Cuban admission into 
CEMA, and by Brezhnev’s visit Cuba in 1974. The story of the Cuban-Soviet alliance during the 
era of détente seems to confirm historian Odd Arne Westad’s assertion that “the most important 
aspects of the Cold War were neither military nor strategic, nor Europe-centered, but connected 
to political and social development in the Third World.”133 Without a relaxation in tensions 
between Washington and Moscow, it may have been difficult indeed for Brezhnev, considering 
the caution he exhibited in his Cuba policy, to have admitted Cuba into CEMA or to have visited 
Cuba at all. This conclusion also supports the assertions of historians Carole Fink and Michael 
Morgan, who both argue that détente served as a way for both superpowers to strengthen their 
own positions within their respective blocs.134  
                                               
132 Ibid., 151. 
 
133 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 396. 
 
134 Michael Cotey Morgan, Personal Conversation with the Author, October 10, 2018; Carole Fink, Cold War: An 
International History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017), 148. 
 
 42 
What does Brezhnev’s visit tell us about the Soviet-Cuban alliance itself? The general 
secretary’s Cuban tour indicates that the Cuban-Soviet relationship was not as one-sided as the 
surrogate thesis contends. The fact that Brezhnev had to negotiate with Castro on détente shows 
us that Cuba was not a compliant recipient of Soviet aid even though its economy relied on 
gigantic Soviet subsidies. Cuba possessed intrinsic value as a former U.S. neocolonial possession 
and the only communist country in the Western hemisphere. The launching of the Spanish-
language version of the Soviet journal Latinskaia Amerika on the occasion of Brezhnev’s Cuban 
trip points to the inherent value Cuba maintained as a propaganda piece in Latin America for the 
Soviet model of development. In the 1970s, Cuba continuously acted to gain more influence in 
its relationship vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Toward this end, Havana developed and maintained 
diplomatic connections in Africa and Latin America on which the Soviet Union came to rely, 
especially as Central America emerged as a revolutionary hotspot in the 1980s.135 The case of 
Cuban and Soviet involvement in the Angolan Civil War demonstrates that Cuba was capable of 
leading the Soviet Union into international conflicts. Castro’s embrace of détente does, however, 
indicate the limitations that Havana’s Soviet connection established. As much as he disliked the 
thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, Cuba’s Soviet connection forced Fidel Castro to at least give a pro 
forma endorsement of détente. Ultimately, both Brezhnev and Castro used the Soviet-Cuban 
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